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Abstract

The major function of this study was to assess differences in interpersonal
cognitive complexity among the four belief systems specified by Harvey’s
Conceptual Systems Theory.

In addition, criticism is offered of many

of the more commonly used indicators of cognitive complexity (e.g. Bieri,
1955) since they tend to identify cognitive complexity with cognitive
differentiation.

Herein is offered an alternative method of measuring

cognitive complexity which is seen as indicating both differentiation and
integration.

The study used 54 graduate and undergraduate students, of
7*

which 35 were females and 19 were males.

••

The alternative method of

calculating cognitive complexity relies upon H i nkle’sy (1965) "laddering"
technique.

A set of constructs was initially elicited from each subject

using K e l l y ’s standard Rep grid.

Out of these constructs one of the subordinate

constructs, as estimated by means of Hinkle’s "implication grid," was used
as the base from which a series of*other constructs were sequentially elicited,
with each successive construct being superordinate to that which proceded it.
In the context of the pyramidally-shaped theoretical model of cognitive
structure herein presented, it is proposed that the number of constructs which
can be strung together in such a subordinate-superordinate chain represents
the number of hierarchical levels within.: the cognitive structure and it is
this number of hierarchical levels which is proposed as a more accurate
approximator of cognitive complexity.

Findings revealed, in fact, that there was

a negative correlation between a differentiation analysis of complexity and the
laddering analysis, suggesting that traditional differentiation scores not
only fail to take integration into account, but, in fact* misrepresent
integration as a lack of cogntivie differentiation.

With regard to the

major hypothesis, neither differentiation scores nor laddering scores
discriminated among any of H arvey’s four conceptual systems, indicating that
Conceptual Systems Theory draws primarily qualitative, rather than quanti
tative, distinctions among construct dimensions used By the four system
types.

CONCEPTUAL SYSTEMS THEORY AND COGNITIVE COMPLEXITY
Thomas T. CoIyer
Univeristy of Nebraska at Omaha
Conceptual Systems Theory (CST) was posited by Harvey, Hunt, and
Schroder (1961) as a theoretical proposition identifying four relatively
independent belief systems into which individuals could be classified.
As originally set forth, CST proposed that the four belief systems be
viewed in developmental terms, thereby implying sequential invariance.
Identified as Systems 1, 2, 3, and 4, the first three systems were
considered to be "arrested stages" composed of individuals who fail to
t**'r''

develop optimally due to inadequate developmental conditions.

Harvey

characterizes a "belief system" in the following manner: .
A "belief system" represents a broad constellation of pre- ;
dispositions to perceive, feel affectively and respond toward
ego-involving stimuli, persons and situations.

Each system

thus should be viewed as being multi-dimensional,

possessing

in some cases certain attributes shared by other systems.
However, the constellation or configuration or gestalt different
for each system renders psychologically different what, out of
such context, would otherwise appear to be similar attributes
in some cases.

Thinking in terms of a factor analytic model*or

some superordinate construct, a system should be viewed as a highorder factor or construct.

(Harvey, note 1, p. 10)

The cognitive dimension conceived to be primary in distinguishing
between these four belief systems was that of "concreteness— abstractness,"
referring to the manner in which the subject differentiated and integrated
his environment.

Concreteness was identified with less differentiation and
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integration, greater reliance upon conventional attitudes, traditions
and authority, greater rigidity, greater intolerance of ambiguity, greater
need for cognitive consistency, and greater tendencies toward absolute
(good— bad) evaluations.

Greater abstractness, on the other hand, was

seen to correspond with a greater ability to generate multiple interpre
tations and a lesser propensity toward rigid stimulus-response connected
ness.

In addition, cognitive abstractness was seen as highly related to

a tendency toward greater relativism with respect to both an individual's
thoughts and behaviors.
The four primary belief systems are clearly distinguishable in a
number of ways, among which is the fact that System 1 individuals are
characterized by both the "a priority assumption” •—

that all objects

and events are controlled by some omnipotent authority —

and the

assumption that "truth1' and "reality" exist externally and independently
of the perceiver.

As a result, such individuals rely heavily upon

traditions, normative standards, authority figures,.and societal l a w s •
as their guidelines for action.

Among such persons one finds a high

degree of religious fundamentalism, relatively high ethnocentrism, and
an overall high need for structure.

They have very strong tendencies

to make absolute evaluations into such dichotomous categories as "good
or bad," with very little tendency to recognize any gradations between
the poles.
The System 2^ individual is best characterized as a "rebel" who
steadfastly rejects ,the external referents of System 1 persons but who
does not have any stable, clearly defined referents of his own on which
to rely.

While generally accepting the idea of absolute truth, he rejects
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those institutional embodiments of such a truth upon which System 1
persons rely so heavily.

System 2 persons seem to exist in a psychological

void, and are best characterized by a high sense of anomie, considerable
cynicism, and very low self-esteem (Harvey, 1967).
System 3 individuals represent increased abstractness due to their
ability to comprehend various- points of view, although their understanding
tends to be characterized by a certain air of superficiality or shallow
ness in that such persons rarely express strong commitment along any
particular line of belief.

Their central concern is for personal

acceptance and approval by others, but at the same time they tend to
foster dependencies in others upon themselves.
Their need to have others dependent upon them and .-to administer
nurturance to others seems to be directed most toward individuals
of low status and low power, possibly because such individuals
are perceived by System 3 persons as being more helpless and
consequently more receptive to their overtures toward helping.
The manifest and latent distinction often made in personality
theory is also appropriate to System 3 functioning.

At the

manifest level, System 3 persons espouse the cause of the more
helpless, proclaim the importance of love and universal human
concern, and express a high desire to help mankind in general.
At the more latent level, System 3 individuals at the same time
are asking that they be the focus of potential help.

(Harvey,

note 1, p. 14)
j
System 4 persons are viewed as the most differentiated and the most
integrated of the four systems, and they are best characterized by a balanced
need for both mutuality and autonomy.

They tend to rank high in terms

of both creativity and tolerance of stress.

Whereas Systems 1 and 2 persons
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tend to validate their conceptions in terms of a priority and System 3
individuals rely upon concensus, System 4 persons tend to be pluralistic
in their search for explanatory principles, recognizing the contributions
of both situational and personality factors in their assessments of events.
The instrument used by Harvey to classify individuals into conceptual
systems is the "This I Believe" (TIB) test.

Of several thousand college

students to whom he administered this test, Harvey (note 1) has reported
that approximately 35% were classified as System 1, 15% as System 2,
20% as System 3, and 7% as System 4.

In addition to the four primary

systems, the original theory also recognized certain admixtures of systems,
and the remaining 23% of students were found to be such combinations of
two or more systems.

However, both H a r v e y ’s own research .and that of
" v r%'.

his colleagues indicate considerable changes in these percentages have
occurred over the past decade, with the major changes being a decrease
in System 2 individuals and an increase in admixtures

(Harvey, note 2).

In addition, although as yet unpublished, Harvey has altered his beliefs
with respect to the sequentiality of the four belief systems.

Harvey

now believes that these systems represent four prominent and "relatively"
permanent coping strategies for dealing with o n e ’s environment.

Harvey

presently speculates that it is likely that one passes through sequential
stages somewhat analogous to the four belief systems (increasing differtiation and integration, increasing evaluative relativism, etc.) within
"each" of the belief systems (Harvey, note 2).
In addition to CST, another means of investigating the manner in
which one deals with his/her environment is with reference to the
individual’s interpersonal cognitive complexity, a field of exploration

5.

launched by Jones

(1954) and followed up by Bieri (1955) and others

(e.g., Tripodi & Bieri, 1963; Jaspars, 1963; Bieri, Atkins, Briar, Leamon,
& Tripodi, 1966),

[Leitner, Landfield, & Barr, note 3}.

This field

derives from Ke l l y 1s (1955) theory of personal constructs, wherein a m a n Ts
central characteristics a r e identified as his propensity for increased
accuracy of prediction in the area of interpersonal relationships.
According to Bieri, the accuracy of o n e ’s predictions is largely determined
by the degree of differentiation associated with o n e ’s construct system.
Inasmuch as constructs represent differential perceptions or
discriminations of the environment, it would be Jexpec ted that
the greater the degree of differentiation among the constructs,
the greater will be the predictive power of tbe individual.
In other words, there should be a positive relationship between
how well an individual’s system of constructs differentiates ,
people in the environment and how well the individual can predict
the behavior of these people...

A system of constructs which

differentiates highly among persons is considered to be cogni
tively complex.

A construct system which provides poor differ

entiation among persons is considered to be cognitively simple in
structure.

(Bieri, 1955, p. 263)

The area of cognitive complexity has been explored primarily through the
use of K e l l y ’s (1955) Role Construct Repertory (Rep) technique.

An in

depth review of the use of the Rep technique can be found in Bannister
and Mair

(1968), and a review of the use of this technique in the

investigation of cognitive complexity can be found in Leitner, Landfield,
and Barr (note 3).

Briefly, the Rep technique has subjects consider
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various triads of persons with whom they are familiar, and for each
triad the subject is asked to generate what Kelly refers to as a
bipolar "construct'1 stating the way in which two of the individuals are
alike and different from the third person.

For example, in viewing a
i '
particular triad the subject may generate the construct dimension
"loving-cruel", indicating that the subj ect perceives two of the persons

as similar, in that they are "loving," and the third person as dissimilar,
in that he/she is perceived as being "cruel."

In the assessment of

cognitive complexity subjects are usually requested to generate 10 to
15 personal constructs, each of which is seen as a cfimension used by
that subject in the interpretation of his/her interpersonal environment.
Kelly (1955) found that when subjects were asked to generate as many
bipolar dimensions as they could, forty constructs was found to be
about the maximum number produced.

When the constructs have been

generated, subjects are asked to rate "all" of the persons used in the
various triads on each of the construct dimensions which were generated,
and although various techniques have been used to arrive at an estimate
of cognitive complexity (Leitner, Landfield, & Barr, note 3), each
estimate considers the differences with respect to the ratings of the
••

various constructs across the set of persons.

Results of such techniques

have produced a variety of indicators of cognitive complexity, all of
which purport to represent the number of separate construct dimensions
used by a subject in the interpretation of his/her environment.
A major criticism of Bieri (1955) and other investigators

(Tripodi

& Bieri, 1963; Jaspars, note 7) with respect to their evaluation of
cognitive complexity is that they fail to deal adequately with that process
so often associated with differentiation, namely, the process of

"integration."

The debate as to the independence or interdependence

of these two processes has been widespread (Schroder & Suedfeld, 1971;
Schroder, Driver, & Streufert, 1976; Harvey, Hunt, & Schroder, 1961;
Vannoy, 1965).

W e r n e r ’s comparative organismic theory of development

(1957) posits a necessary interdependence of these two processes in
stressing the dialecticalnature of development.
Each stage of organization is simultaneously directed toward
maintaining continuity* or stability and generating discontinuity
or transformation.

The fundamental thesis is that evolution is
.i’V.

a synthetic process that interweaves two antithetical organismic
tendencies:

to maintain continuity in ;order to conserve o n e ’s

integrity (survival and organizational coherence) and to ela
borate discontinuity in order to develop.
Werner,

(Langer, 1970, p. 734)

therefore, applied the principle of orthogenesis to psychological

development, viewing such growth in terms of the complementary processes
of differentiation, aimed at elaboration of the system, and integration,
aimed at the maintenance of the organism’s integrity.

He identified

stages of mental development as syntheses of these two antithetical
processes.
Harvey (1966) has contended that flexibility and adaptability in
any system is enhanced with increases in differentiation and integration
within that system, and Conceptual Systems Theory clearly suggests that
significant differences in flexibility and adaptability do exist across
the four conceptual systems.

Both Campbell (I960) and Brennan (note 4)

have reported linear increases in complexity across the four conceptual
systems, with System 4 individuals emerging as highest in cognitive

a

complexity.

However, Brennan reported a correlation coefficient of

only +.21 between scores generated by the Harvey TIB technique and
those from the Tripodi and Bieri (1963) differentiation technique.
Streufert and Fromkin (1972) have likewise reported low correlations
between TIB scores and B i e r i ’s modified Rep technique analysis of
differentiation, and Harvey, Reich, and Wyer (1968) found no signi
ficant differences in differentiation scores between concrete (Systems
1 & 2 combined) and abstract (Systems 3 & 4 combined) subjects.

Further

more, Harvey, Wyer, and Hautaluoma (1963, note 8) reported no significant
differences for either differentiation or integrationacross conceptual
systems, although they did find that System 4 individuals were signifi
cantly better differentiators than were System 1 individuals.
These findings would appear to cast doubt upon H a r v e y ’s assumption
(1966) that there exist significant differences between conceptual
systems on measures of flexibility and adaptability if, indeed, these
qualities are highly correlated with differentiation and integration
within the cognitive structure.

Thomas and Seeman’s (1972) review of

research relating cognitive complexity to personal adjustment does,
in fact, lend support to speculations that flexibility and adaptability
are correlated with cognitive complexity.
Jones

(1954, 1961) found that neuropsychiatric subjects had

simpler cognitive structures than normal subjects.

. .

Lundy

(1952, 1956) and Bannister (personal communication, November
5, 1967) found that as a person was exposed' to a therapeutic
relationship his cognitive structures become more differentiated.
Complex individuals make higher scores on measures of social
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intelligence (Sechrest & Jackson, 1961), are more able to
assume social roles (Harvey, 1962; Harvey & Kline, 1965;
Wolfe, 1963), and are judged to be better psychotherapists
(Gottesman, 1962).

[Thomas & Seeman, 1972]

If such findings are accepted as evidence of a positive correlation
between personal adjustment, in terms of flexibility and adaptability,
and cognitive complexity, then the lack of evidence showing signi
ficant differences in cognitive complexity across H arvey’s four conceptual
systems could be interpreted as evidence that Conceptual Systems
Theory does not discriminate between persons on the basis of adaptability
and flexibility.
Schroder, Driver, and Streufert (1967) h y p othesizetha£ cognitive
constructs are arranged such that they can be viewed as a series of
hierarchical levels which successively contain fewer elements as the
apex is approached.

It is assumed that constructs residing at the

same hierarchical level are uncorrelated; however, when considering
more than one hierarchical level, constructs residing at different
levels possess the potential for some degree of correlation, depending
upon the hierarchical bonding within the particular cognitive structure.
The implications of such a theoretical model call into question the
validity of certain techniques of assessing cognitive differentiation
(e.g., Bieri, 1955; Bieri, Atkins, Briar, Leamon, & Tripodi, 1966;
Tripodi & Bieri, 1963) in that such methods of assessment fail to
take into consideration differences in the hierarchical level of those
constructs being analyzed.

The hierarchical relationships between

constructs represent cognitive integration, which is an essential
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aspect of cognitive complexity overlooked by most existing research
methodologies (e.g., Bieri, et al., 1966).
Crockett

(1965) has researched the area of cognitive complexity

taking into consideration both the process of differentiation and that
of integration.

Crockett (1965) defines differentiation in terms of

the number of independent constructs used by an individual, whereas he
characterizes integration in terms of both,

"the complexity of the

relationships among constructs, and the degree to which clusters of
constructs are related by superordinate, integrating constructs"
(Crockett, 1965, p. 50).

Furthermore, Crockett found some evidence

indicating that, "subjects who show a highly complex "system with respect
to one domain of events will also show high complexity: with respect to
other domains"

(Crockett, 1965, p. 62).

This finding lends credence

to theoretical speculation that cognitive "structure," rather than
simply learned content, is basic to cognitive complexity.
The present study, in exploring the relationship between conceptual
systems theory and cognitive complexity, adopts a model of cognitive
structure which conforms to Bannister’s conception of the structure of
construct systems as stated below:
This pyramidal structure of construct systems seems to serve
a variety of purposes in science and in living.

For example, if

we accept that the more superordinate constructs will have more impli
cations and a wider range of convenience than their subordinate
constructs,

then ’climbing up our system’ may be a way of finding

strategies for cross-referencing more subordinate constructions
which cannot be directly related to each other ’across’ the system.
Thus the old adage that you c a n ’t add ’horses’ and ’c o w s ’ is nonsense
as soon as you climb up the subsystem and subsume them both as
’farm animals’ and you can blithely add in ’hermit crabs' if you are

prepared to climb up as far as 1forms of organic life.'

Equally,

you may use the hierarchy as a conflict-resolving process by making
decisions in terms of the most superordinate, relevant construct.
For example, for some of us ’courteous-discourteous’ may be a
subordinate construct to ’kind-unkind’, and if this be so we may,
in exceptional circumstances, decide to be ’discourteous’ if we
feel that in the long run this is the ’kindest’ way to be
(say in curtailing a mutually disastrous relationship).
[Bannister, 1970, p. 57]
The present model, therefore, conceives of cognitive structure as
being pyramidal in shape, with those constructs lying closest to the
apex of the pyramidal structure being the more superordinate constructs
within the system.

Cognitive structure may be viewed as a series of

hierarchical levels wherein those constructs at any one particular
level are, by definition, independent from other constructs at the
same hierarchical level.

Although perhaps best represented in three-

dimensional form, Figure 1 presents this concept in two-dimensional
form for the sake of simplicity.

All connections between constructs

in this model occur between hierarchical levels rather than within
a particular hierarchical level.

It should be noted that within this

Insert Figure 1 about here

model there is the possibility for relationships between constructs of
nonadjacent levels, although only, three such connections ■(represented
as dotted lines) are demonstrated in the present model.

Furthermore,
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the actual number of hierarchical levels are hypothesized to vary a
great deal among subjects, and it is this number of levels which will
be explored as one of the possible indicators of cognitive complexity.
Hinkle (1965) introduced two very promising methods of exploring
the hierarchical relationships between constructs in the form of an
"implication grid" and a "laddering procedure," and he thereby introduced
into grid methodology the means whereby integration could be considered
along with differentiation so as to afford a more complete picture of
cognitive structure.

The implication grid technique involves the

comparison of each construct with every other so as'to allow assessment
of the superordinate-subordinate relationships within a particular set
of constructs.

The laddering procedure is a technique whereby the

experimenter elicits a series of constructs, starting from a position
of subordinancy within the cognitive system and moving in a stepwise
fashion up through the hierarchical structure until the subject reaches
that point which is presumed to be the apex of his/her cognitive
structure.-

Hinkle (1965) devised this technique to explore the

hierarchical relationships between construct dimensions within the
individual’s cognitive structure, and the result of this process is
the delineation of a pathway of successive superordinate implications.
The present study utilized the laddering technique by starting
the process at what was determined by use of the implication grid
to be a relatively subordinate position within the individual’s
cognitive structure.

Constructs of progressively increasing super-

ordinancy were theh. elicited until the subjects could produce no fur
ther superordinate constructs.

The number of new constructs produced

was seen to represent the number of hierarchical levels within the
individual’s cognitive structure, and this number of hierarchical
levels was then used as an indicator of cognitive complexity.

The

assumption made, herein, to justify the use of this measure as an
indicator of cognitive complexity involves the theoretical speculation
that whereas differentiation along a particular hierarchical level is
inherently limited by a lack of integrative links, as demonstrated in
Figure 1, differentiation with respect to hierarchical level represents
the number of units of height of the pyramidal cognitive structure.
Each level has a separate differentiation potential and is integratively
linked to other levels.

We r n e r ’s theory (Carmichael, 1970) purports

that cognitive complexity can only proceed so long as the organism’s
integrity is maintained, and such maintenance is a function of inte
grative links which, in the model just presented, necessarily involves
separate hierarchical levels.

Comparing this measure with most of the

differentiation analyses of the Rep technique which have been used to
estimate cognitive complexity (Bannister & Mair, 1968), one finds that
with the differentiation techniques one is measuring the number of
independent constructs, with such independence being the result of
separate constructs having few or no perceptible links existing between
them for that particular subject.

On the other hand, consider the

constructs ’considerate’ and ’k ind.’

It may be hypothesized that for

some persons these two concepts are relatively synonymous,

such that

whenever such a person perceives either one of these two qualities,
the other quality automatically becomes a part of that perception.
Thus, if one perceives the quality of ’considerateness’ in another,

he/she also necessarily perceives that other person as being ’k i n d , ’
since for such an individual these two qualities are not differentiated
from one another.
A further aspect of complexity with which the differentiation
measure appears to be unable to deal is whether or not an individual
actually perceives two such constructs as simply synonomous terms,
or whether the individual does, in fact, discriminate between the two
terms even though he/she tends to see them as covarying with one
another.

This latter case clearly represents greater discriminability

than does the former, yet the differentiation analysis may fail to
discriminate between these two cases.

Keeping mind the cognitive

structure model which has been proposed, one can see that cognitive
complexity:^ as measured by differentiation, increases in proportion to
the extent to which the subject originally generated either constructs
horizontally positioned with respect to one another (at the same
heirarchical level) or constructs from different hierarchical levels
but with no superordinate-subordinate relationship existing betxveen the
two constructs for that particular subject.

The danger with relying

upon such an analysis is that if a subject chooses a number of separate
constructs which are hierarchically related to one another, the subject’
cognitive complexity may appear lower than it should due to the lack
of sensitivity of the measuring instrument being used.
In the present study, methods other than differentiation are
explored as possible indicators of cognitive complexity.
the cognitive model presented,

Based upon

"hierarchical differentiation" or

"integrated differentiation" would appear to be a feasible and perhaps

preferable alternative to the differentiation analysis of the Rep
technique (e.g., Bieri* 1955; Tripodi & Bieri, 1963) since hierarchical
differentiation involves both differentiation and integration, these
being the two components of cognitive complexity identified by Crockett
(1965).

Whereas o n e ’s differentiation score is based upon the number

of constructs generated which do no imply one another, and therefore
are not identified as identical in content, one's laddering score is •
based upon the number of constructs which one can generate while
continually moving in the direction of increasing superordinancy.
Rather than sampling a random set of interpersonal constructs and
.yV..

analyzing them in terms of their degree of independence from one
another, with no controls over the superordinate-subordinate relationships
among those constructs, the laddering technique :attempts to*measure the
number of hierarchical levels within one's cognitive structure by
attempting to tap a series of constructs wherein each construct is from
a different hierarchical level and .has implications with respect to at
least two other constructs in the series (i.e., one superordinata
implication and one subordinate implication).

The primary advantage

of the laddering procedure would appear to be that all subjects are
operating under the same ground rules in their selection of constructs',
whereas with the differentiation analysis of the Rep technique subjects
are free to choose from any: number of hierarchical levels, such that
a person who chooses from a single level would necessarily appear to
be quite differentiated whereas one who chooses from a series of levels
has a greater chance of selecting constructs related by superordinatesubordinate implications.

In a differentiation analysis of a set of
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constructs, the greater the number of superordinate-subordinate impli
cations, the greater the likelihood is of those constructs being analyzed
as undifferentiated from one another.
that "differentiation"

It is suggested, therefore,

(Bieri, 1963; et al.) and "integrated differen

tiation11 (as measured by the aforementioned laddering technique) have
different referents with regard to cognitive structure.

Since "inte

grated differentiation" takes into consideration "integration" in addition
to "differentiation,"it is hypothesized that a non-sighificant
Spearman Rho correlation will be found to exist between differentiation
scores and laddering scores.
The "integrated differentiation" measure will be further examined
by dividing laddering scores into a high, medium, and low group, such
that four additional measures can be tested as to their potential
usefulness as differentiators among the three group of laddering scores.
These measures, derived from the Implication Grid and referred to by
Crockett and Meisel (1974) as "degree of connectedness" indicators,
are determined by the number of times the various constructs within
the cognitive system imply the presence or absence of other constructs
within the system.

These degree of connectedness scores will be of

two primary types, namely, those that disregard reciprocal implications
and those that include reciprocal implications in their computation.
A further division within each of these two major categories will
consist of separate connectedness scores computed first for constructs
generated by the Rep technique, and, secondly, for constructs generated
by the laddering technique.
examined are as follows:

Thus, the four connectedness scores

Rep connectedness with reciprocals (RepconWR),

Rep connectedness with no reciprocals (RepconNR), Laddering connectedness
with reciprocals
reciprocals

(LadconWR), and Laddering connectedness with no

(LadconNR).

Crockett and Meisel (1974), in their use of

the "degree of connectedness," did not discount reciprocal implications,
and according to the cognitive model presented herein, one could anti
cipate that there would be a negative correlation between RepconWR
scores and differentiation scores if, in fact, a significant proportion
of the implications were reciprocal.

Such an hypothesis is based upon

the fact that within the context of the present model reciprocal impli
cations are interpreted as demonstrating a lack of differentiation
between those constructs being compared since the constructs demonstrate
no superordinate-subordinate relationship to one another.

Rather,

such reciprocal implications imply synonomous relationships between
constructs of the same hierarchical level.

On the other hand, RepconNR

scores are hypothesized to have a positive correlation with differentiation
scores since the ability to perceive quantitative differences in the
degree of implication of the two constructs indicates both ability to
discern between ftiose constructs and the fact that the relationship
between those constructs is one of superordinancy-subordinancy.

It

is anticipated, however, that this correlation will not exceed the
+ .2 to + .3 range since differentiation scores tend to misrepresent
superordinate-subordinate relationships, viewing them as indicative
of a synonomous relationship between constructs rather than as
differentiated constructs.

Since differentiation scores are derived

from comparisons of the ratings of the various constructs across
role categories, there is no direct comparison of constructs in the
differentiation analysis.

It is due to this factor that RepconNR

analyses are predicted to be only moderately correlated with the
differentiation analyses.

Whereas a differentiation analysis fails
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to discriminate between covariation of construct ratings based upon
synonomous relationships and covariation based upon superordinatesubordinate relationships, RepconNR scores do distinguish between
these forms of construct relationships.
With regard to the usefulness of the "degree of connectedness”
indicators as differentiators of low, medium, and high laddering scores,
it is anticipated that RepconNR scores, L a d c o n N R scores, and! LadconWR
scores will all differentiate among subjects of high, medium and
low laddering complexity.

It is theorized that LadconNR scores and

LadconWR scores will not be significantly different from one another
since both of these connectedness scores are derived^from constructs
which were drawn from different hierarchical levels.

Therefore, very
“'L'rV

few, if any, reciprocal implications are anticipated to emerge in the
computation of the LadconWR scores, and as such, RepconNR scores,
LadconNR scores, and LadconWR scores are all predicted to accurately
reflect the relative degree of connectedness (non-reciprocal implications)
of the subjects’ cognitive structures.

These three scores are thus

theorized to represent hierarchical integration within cognitive
structure, and are therefore anticipated to differentiate among the
low, medium and high laddering scores which are also theorized to
reflect the relative degree of hierarchical integration.

It is also

expected that RepconWR scores will discriminate between the high and
low laddering complexity groups, however, in this case the high RepconWR
scores, indicating a lack of hierarchical differentiation, are predicted
to be associated with the low laddering group, whereas the low RepconWR
scores are predicted to be associated with the high laddering group.

The final part of this study will consider the relationship between
cognitive complexity and Conceptual Systems Theory.

This will be done

be viewing each of five potential cognitive complexity indicators
(i.e., differentiation scores, laddering scores, RepconWR scores,
RepconNR scores, and LadconWR scores) as potential discriminators of
Har v e y ’s four conceptual systems, analyzed by means of five one-way
analyses of variance.

Based upon previous findings (i.e., Streufert

& Fromkin, 1972; Harvey, Reich, & Wyer, 1968; Harvey, Wyer, & Hautaluoma, 1963; Brennan, 1973) and upon H a rvey’s personal speculations
(Harvey,: note 3) concerning the existence of stages within conceptual
systems,

it is anticipated that there will be no significant differences

found with respect to cognitive complexity, as measured by'any of these
techniques, across the four conceptual systems posed by Harvey, et al..
(1961).
The following hypothesis are therefore proposed:
1.

No significant correlation will be found to exist between

differentiation scores based upon the Rep technique and hierarchical
differentiation scores determined by the laddering technique.

This

is based upon the supposition that the. laddering technique estimates
the number of hierarchical levels in the cognitive structure, indicating
both differentiation and integration according to the cognitive structure
model presented herein.

This is in contradistinction to the Rep tech

nique based differentiation scores which indicate the extent to which
individuals apply constructs differentially across a set of significant
others,

thereby ignoring the important factor of integration,

i It

is
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this difference which gives rise to the hypothesis that a non-significant
Spearman Rho correlation will be found to exist between differentiation
scores and laddering scores.
2.

Two of the connectedness scores will be compared with differi

entiation scores using Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients,
with the expectation that RepconWR scores will be negatively correlated
with differentiation scores and that RepconNR scores will be positively
correlated with differentiation scores.

This prediction is derived

from the cognitive model herein presented which suggests that reciprocal
■ vV_
implications are indicative of a lack of differentiation between constructs.
The correlation between RepconNR scores and differentiation scores,
however, is not expected to exceed the + .2 to + .3 range since
differentiation scores fail to discriminate between synonomous rela
tionships and superordinate-subordinate relationships between constructs.
3.

A series of one-way analyses of variance will determine

which of four dependent variables will discriminate between subjects
who have been separated into groups of high, medium, and low laddering
complexity.

The four dependent variables tested are the four connec

tedness scores.

RepconNR scores, LadconNR scores, and LadconWR scores-

are all expected to discriminate among the three laddering groups, and
these predictions are all based upon the premise that the number of
hierarchical steps (laddering score) is indicative of the overall
cognitive complexity, and that the higher the cognitive complexity
(high laddering score), the higher the degree of'connectedness
(hierarchical integration).

RepconWR scores are1 also predicted to
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differentiate between the high and low laddering complexity groups,
although in this case an inverse relationship is hypothesized.
4.

Five one-way analyses of variance will be performed to test

the feasibility of using differentiation scores, laddering scores,
RepconWR scores, RepconNR scores, and LadconWR scores as possible
differentiators among Harvey’s four conceptual systems.

It is

predicted that none of these postulated cognitive complexity indicators
will adequately differentiate among belief systems due to the hypothesis
that these systems, rather than being sequential with respect to
•;>

cognitive complexity, each contains subjects ranging"across the cognitive
complexity spectrum.
Method
Subjects
Fifty-four graduate and undergraduate, students from the University
of Nebraska at Omaha served as subjects, of which 35 were females and
19 were males.

This sample consisted of 17 System 1 individuals,

11 from System 2, 11 from System 3, and 15 from System 4, and the great
majority of these persons received extra credit for their participation.
These 54 subjects were chosen as the best representatives of their respective
conceptual systems from among approximately 150 subjects who were initially
administered the "This I Believe Test."
Procedure
Assessment of Conceptual Systems
Conceptual level was established by relying on the "This I Believe
Test" (TIB), an instrument devised by Harvey (1963) which has been shown
to have a test-retest reliability over a nine.week period of .94 (Greaves, 1971)
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and an interjudge reliability of .90 when trained judges are used.
1966)

(Harvey,

This test asked that the subject indicate his beliefs with respect

to 10 concepts assumed to be relevant to him, and in each case the particular
referent was indicated by the phrase, "This I believe about __________ ," with
the blank filled by one of the following referents:

the American way of

life, religion, people, marriage, friendship, sin, rules, revenge, lying,
and calling a teacher by his/her first name.

The test was presented

to the subjects in the form of a booklet with the phrase inclusive of one
of the referents at the top of each page.

The cover to this booklet included

the following instructions:

%

On the following pages you will be asked to write your opinions
or beliefs about several topics.
sentences about each topic.

Please write at least two (2)

You will be timed on each topic at a

pace that will make it necessary for you to work rapidly.
Be sure to write what you genuinely believe.
You must write on the topics in the order of their appearance.
Wait to turn each page until the experimenter gives you the signal.
Once you have turned the page, do not turn back to it.
PLEASE.DO NOT OPEN THIS BOOKLET UNTIL YOU ARE INSTRUCTED TO BEGIN.

(Harvey,

note 1, pg. 22).
The timing for these ten referents varied, with the first five being
allotted 2 minutes each and the second five given 1 minute and 45 seconds
each.

This cut in time for the second five referents was introduced

so as to meet H a rvey’s recommendation that pressure be kept on the
individual in order to maximize an indication ofi the belief.
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The classification of these TIB tests into conceptual systems was
based on HarveyTs scoring instructions (Harvey, note 1), and the criteria
for selection of a subject as representative of a particular conceptual
system was initially based upon the agreement of five out of six judges.
Expediency required that criteria for selection be altered after approximately
one half of the subjects had been selected, with the altered standards
being the unanimous agreement of three judges.

The scoring process

is based upon an overall rating of the booklet in its entirety rather
than an additive approach which considers the response to each referent
separately.
Assessment of Interpersonal Cognitive Complexity
Role Construct Repertory Technique.

This procedure for investigating

an individual’s construct system was devised by Kelly (1955) and relied upon
by Bieri (1955) in his attempt to measure cognitive complexity with respect
to o n e ’s interpersonal environment.

A detailed review of Role Construct

Repertory (REP) technique has been developed by Bannister and Mair

(1968).

In the present experiment the subject was presented with a 10 x 15 grid
(Appendix 1) and asked to fill in the ten spaces across the top with
individuals from his/her social environment who fit the particular role
categories provided.

These role categories consisted of the following:

(1) Mother or person who is most like a mother to you;
person who is most like a father to you;

(2) Father or

(3) Brother nearest your age or,

if you do not have a brother, then the person who is most like a brother
to you;

(4) Sister nearest your age or, if you do not have a sister, then

the person who is most like a sister to you;

(5'f

Husband or wife or, if
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you are not married, a close friend of the opposite sex;
of the same sex as yourself;
to dislike you;

(7) Person you dislike;

(6) Close friend

(8) Person who seems

(9) Person who makes you feel uncomfortable;

person who holds a position of authority over you.

(10) Boss or

Each of the fifteen

rows of the grid had three different role categories marked, and the
subject was asked to successively consider each row of the grid and
determine some personality characteristic on which two of the individuals
were similar and different from the third.

In order that all subjects

operate within the same general parameters, they were instructed to avoid
physical descriptions.

In the course of generating -the adjective dimensions
*. •..

the subjects were monitored and informed of those constructs which were
unsatisfactory and necessitated alteration (e.g., male-female, from
one location-from a different location).

After generating the fifteen

construct dimensions, subjects were asked to rate each of the ten
individuals (role categories) on each of the fifteen dimensions.

These

ratings were based upon a 7-point Likert-type scale, with one through
three indicating degrees along the similarity pole of the dimension,
four being neutral or indicating that the dimension does not apply to
the individual, and five through seven indicating degrees along the contrast
pole of dimension.

These ratings were placed in the grid box corresponding

to the particular individual— construct dimension comparison being considered.
Finally, subjects were asked to make a forced choice with respect to
pole preference for each of the fifteen adjective dimensions.
This Rep grid was analyzed using a modified form of Bieri's
technique, devised by Millimet
of differentiation.

(1955)

(note 5), so as to arrive at a measure

This procedure has been described by Millimet and

Brien (note 6) as follows:
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The scoring procedure...consists of subtracting the 10 ratings
associated with one construct dimension from the corresponding
10 ratings of a second construct dimension.

The 10 difference

scores, including sign, are compared to each other so that all
possible pairings (45) are considered.

One point is scored for

each pair of differences which are identical in sign and value.
This procedure is performed for each of the 105 pairings of the
15 construct dimensions and summed to derive a total construct
differentiation score which can range from 0 to 4725.

The lower

the total score, the greater the dif ferentiationy,n. o n e ’s personal
construct system.

A minor modification in scoring is required to

facilitate the analysis for some instances where' a/negative
relationship exists between the construct dimensions.

(Millimet

& Brien, note 6, pg. 6)
Implication Grid Technique.

This procedure was devised by Hinkle

(1965) to make pairwise comparisons between constructs within a grid
framework, thereby yielding Ma schematic representation (in matrix form)
of the superordinate and subordinate implications that interrelate a set
of constructs.”

(Bannister & Mair, 1968, p. 88).

Subjects were presented

with a 25 x 25 grid, on which the preferred pole of those constructs
generated in the REP test were listed in the same order both down the
side of the grid as well as across the top of the grid.

Those listed

did not include repetitions which may have appeared on the REP test.
Each construct was paired twice with every other (i.e., 1 with 2,
2 with 1, etc.), and therefore if 15 nonreplicated constructs had been
initially generated, the subject would make 210 comparisons (no construct
being paired with itself).

The instructions to.the subjects were as follows:
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In this task you are asked to consider the following:

"If you know

that a particular characteristic is true of a stranger, to what
extent would you be able to assume that certain other characteristics
are also true of that stranger?"
Taking one at a time, you will consider those attribute dimensions
to the right of the grid (rows) as characteristics assumed to be
true of the stranger, and those at the top of the grid (columns)
as possible implications.

For each comparison you will consider

the amount of information that the row characteristic ("characteristic
assumed to be true") provides you with respect

to *

the column

characteristic ("characteristic possibly implied").

For example,

consider that the only thing one 1kn o w s 1 about a stranger is that
he/she is "friendly" (row characteristic —

assumed to be true);

to what extent would you then be able to assume that the stranger
is also "honest" (column characteristic —

possibly implied)?

For comparing each row characteristic to each column characteristic,
use a 0 to 3 rating scale as follows:
0 = knowledge of first (row) characteristic gives no information
about second (column) -characteristic
1 = knowledge of first (row) characteristic gives a. small-amount
of information about second (column) characteristic
2 = knowledge of first (row) characteristic gives a: moderate
amount of information about second (column) characteristic
3 - knowledge of first (row) characteristic gives a great deal
o f i n f o r m a t i o n about second (column) characteristic.
Compare each row characteristic to each column characteristic using
this scale.
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The Implication Grid technique (Imp Grid) was used for two different
purposes in the present study.

First, it was used to look at the

general superordinate-subordinate positioning of constructs within a
particular cognitive structure.

Superordinate constructs are assumed
t

to

give more information concerning their subordinate counterparts than

vice v e rsa, and thus, in a situation where the construct "sincerity*1
yields "a great deal of information" (3 rating) concerning "honesty,"
whereas "honesty" yields only "a-small amount of information" (1 rating)
with respect to "sincerity," one could conclude that "sincerity" holds
a superordinate position to "honesty" within that particular cognitive
schema.

In order that the laddering technique accurately reflect cognitive

complexity it is essential that the procedure begin with subordinate
constructs within the system.

By summing the rows of the Imp Grid,

information is obtained concerning the amount of information each construct
implies with respect to the rest of the constructs within the system, and
this may be used as an indicator of superordinancy.

By selecting for

laddering those constructs whose implication score resulted in the smallest
sum, one can be assured that the bottom construct in the ladder implies
relatively little about the rest of the generated constructs, and thus
the assumption can'be made that the laddering procedure is beginning at
a relatively subordinate position within the cognitive structure.

By

laddering off of the most subordinate constructs within the system,
probabilities are maximized for eliciting the greatest number of constructs
from different hierarchical levels.
"Second,

the Imp Grid was used to arrive at what Hinkle (1965) referred

to as "degree of connectedness", this measure being viewed as an indicator

28

of integration within the system.

Hinkle arrived at this score by simply

counting the total number of t w o ’s and three’s within the grid, but the
present study found it necessary to divide this total by the total possible
number of t w o ’s and three’s so as to standardize for the fact that the
different subject grids were of varying sizes.

In addition, reciprocal

implications were hypothesized to imply lack of differentiation between
constructs, and thus, in a situation where construct A gave a moderate
amount of information about construct B (rate ”2") and B gave a moderate
amount of information about construct A (rated ”2”), these ratings were
ignored in computing those connectedness scores which discounted reciprocals.
However,

if construct A gave a great deal of information concerning the

presence of absence of construct B (rated ”3”) whereas construct B only
gave a moderate amount of information concerning the presence of absence
of construct A (rated ”2 ”), then the relationship was not considered to
be reciprocal and both ratings were included in the computation of those
’’degree of connectedness" scores discounting reciprocals.

On the other

hand, for those degree of connectedness scores which did not discount
reciprocals, the scores simply consisted of the total number of t w o ’s
and three’s in the grid divided by the total possible number of t w o ’s and
three* s.
Laddering Techniques.

Hinkle’s (1965) development of the laddering

procedure was precipitated by what he perceived as the necessity of
taking into consideration hierarchical integration when investigating
cognitive structure.

In viewing the results of this measure as an

indication of cognitive complexity, as the present study proceeds to do,
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one is assuming that cognitive structure is pyramidal or triangular
in shape and that those constructs located near the apex of the structure
tend to be superordinate to and have broader "ranges of convenience"
(Kelly, 1955) than do those constructs nearer to the base.

As used herein,

this procedure is simply an attempt to measure the number of hierarchical
levels within a subject’s cognitive structure.
The laddering procedure began by writing down the subordinate
construct dimension selected on the basis of Imp Grid analysis, and asking
the subject to explain why he/she had preferred the one pole of the construct
to the other.

Such questions were posed as, "What a r ^ the advantages of

this side to that side?" (pointing)

[Bannister & Mair, 1968, p. 84], and,

"Why do you value this (pointing) over that?

Does this (pointing) serve

some higher function for you that is not served by that (pointing)?"
Thus, for example, a subject might start from the dimension
"reserved-emotional” (preferring to see himself at the "reserved"
pole) and in answer to the question,

"Why do you prefer to be

’reserved’?", might indicate that reserved people tend to be
"relaxed" while emotional people tend to be "nervous."

The

dimension "relaxed-nervous" would then be taken as the first
superordinate construction, with the subject preferring to view
himself as "relaxed."

Next (in answer to "why?") he might suggest

that he preferred being relaxed because, in his opinion, being
relaxed would lead to "getting on better with people," while being
» nervous might result in "difficulties with people."

Here the second

superordinate is "getting on better with people-difficulties with
people"; the preferred pole is known, and a further query will lead
on to the next act of superordination and so forth."
1968, p. 84)

(Bannister & Mair,
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After the first superordinate construct had been generated the subject
was told that the procedure would continue until he/she reached the point
at which the particular construct was seen to be valued in and of itself,
such that it could be seen to serve no higher function for that particular
individual.

The subject was further told that it was very important that

he/she make every effort to reach that point beyond which they could go
no further in order that an accurate portrayal of their personal values
could be recorded.

In addition, occasionally the subjects were asked to

go back and review their construct ladder in order to ensure that the
-■V

movement was continually upwards in terms of their value system-, and
not downwards or merely definitional in character!

Occasionally during

this review process steps were added, deleted, or altered b£ the subjects.
Although uniformity with respect to the number of ladders produced
by each subject was initially a part of the experimental design, there
were rather large disparities between subjects with respect to the time
required to generate construct ladders, with some subjects requiring as
much as forty minutes to generate one long ladder of 10 or 11 constructs,
whereas other subjects would complete four ladders of 3 or 4 constructs
eachiin as little as fifteen minutes.

Thus, although the number of

ladders completed by subjects varied, the primary criteria sought by
the experimenter in this task was the maximum number of hierarchical
steps possibleffor each subject within a particular construct hierarchy
(ladder).

The time factor and the number of ladders attempted by subjects

were deemed of secondary importance, and therefore were not controlled for
in the present experiment.

Following the elicitation of Lhese additional

constructs, they were added to the Implication Grid and the subjects were
asked to complete the grid according to the same procedure previously followed.
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Results

Hypothesis 1^ —
laddering scores.

Correlation between differentiation scores and
This hypothesis predicting a non-significant correlation

between differentiation sc.ores

(high differentiation 'score' indicates low

cognitive differentiation) and laddering scores was found to be inaccurate.
Rather, a significant positive Spearman Rho correlation coefficient of
+0.29

(N = 54, p = .016) was found, accounting for approximately nine per

cent of the variance.

The Spearman Rho correlation coefficient was used

due to the fact that the laddering scores are not necessarily equal interval
measures.
Hypothesis

2_

—

Correlations between two connectedness scores and

the differentiation scores.

The Pearson product-moment correlation between

RepconWR and differentiation "scores" was +0.34 (N_ = 54, p = .016) indicating
a significant positive correlation, whereas that between RepconNR and
differentiation "scores" was -0.09 (N = 54, £__> .05), and thus non-significant.
Thus, only the first half of this hypothesis regarding the RepconWR scores,
was supported.

Hypothesis 3 —

Four connectedness scores as possible discriminators

of high, medium, and low laddering scores.

This hypothesis went unsupported

with respect to each of the four measures considered.

Omnibus 1? values failed

to reach significance for RepconNR scores (F (2, 51) = 0.54, £ = .591), LadconNR
scores (F (2, 51) = 0.06, £ = .929), LadconWR scores (F (2, 51) = 0.28, £=^-.759),
and RepconWR scores (F (2, 51) = 0.84, p = .442).

Comparisons were also

made between the extreme groups (high and low laddering groups) with each of
Lhe connectedness scores, however, the £ test results for RepconNR scores
(t (51) = 0.11, £ = .909), LadconNR scores (t (51) = 0.36, £ = .722) LadconWR
scores (_t_ (51) = 0.17, _£ = .865), and RepconWR scores (_t (51) = 1.22, p = .277)
all failed to reach the .05 level of significance.
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Hypothesis 4^ —

Differentiation, Laddering scores, RepconWR scores,

RepconNR scores, and LadconWR scores as possible differentiators among
Harvey1s four conceptual systems.

This hypothesis was supported with

respect to all five possible discriminators in that "none" of these
measures adequately differentiated among H arvey Ts four conceptual systems
'i

in the six one-way analyses of variance performed.
(F (3, 50) = 0.25, £ ~ .861), laddering scores

Differentiation scores

(F (3, 50) = 1.26, £ = .299),

RepconWR scores (F (3, 50) = 1 . 0 7 , £ = .373), RepconNR scores (F (3, 50) =
1.16, £ = .334), and LadconWR scores (1? (3, 50) = 0.22, £ = .879) all failed
to achieve significant I? ratios with regard to Harveys four conceptual
systems.

In addition, all possible t test comparisons^, using the pooled

5

. . v>" ' •.

-

1
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variance terms, were computed for each of these five measures, and even with
the magnification of Type I errors accompanying such multiple _t tests, no
significant comparisons were found.
Discussion
Although the major thrust of this investigation involved the
relationship between Conceptual Systems Theory and cognitive complexity,
the study additionally sought to explore the adequacy of alternative
indicators of cognitive complexity in an effort to more accurately reflect
the actual number of dimensions which an individual uses in interpreting
his

interpersonal

environment.

Through the introduction of a cognitive

structure model it was hypothesized that the factor of integration was
essential as a complementary factor to that of differentiation in acquiring
an accurate perspective with regard to cognitive complexity.

Indicators

of integration were in the form oj: four separate "degree of connectedness"
scores as well as in the laddering score, the latter reflecting both
differentiation and integration and therefore viewed as the best single
\

index of cognitive complexity.
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The results regarding Hypothesis 1 demonstrates a significant negative
correlation between cognitive differentiation and laddering scores since a
high differentiation "score" indicates low cognitive differentiation.

This

raises several interesting questions regarding the cognitive structure model
presented herein.

One of the basic theoretical underpinnings of this model

was W e r n e r ’s suggestion that differentiation and integration are complementary
to one another, implying that as one increases, the other does likewise.

This

finding suggests that if Werner’s speculations are correct, the differentiation
scores may not only give an inaccurate estimate of cognitive complexity but
may, in fact, lead on to conclusions opposite to those which reflect the
actual cognitive complexity of the individual.

An hypothesis may, therefore,

be posed that traditional differentiation scores (Bieri, 1963; et al.) not
only fail to account for cognitive construct integration, but actually mis
represent integration as a lack of differentiation in a significant number
of cases.

While it was originally hypothesized that this situation would

occur enough so as to lead to a non-significant correlation between dif
ferentiation and laddering scores, it was unexpected to find the significant
"negative" correlation emerge.
Findings regarding Hypothesis 2, dealing with correlations between
RepconWR and RepconNR scores and differentiation scores, were only
partially supported.

The significant positive correlation between RepconWR

scores and differentiation "scores" indicating a significant negative correlation between RepconWR scores/) "cognitive differentiation", implies that
a significant number of the implications for the Rep constructs were recip
rocal, and therefore would be rated quite similarly across role categories
in the differentiation analysis using the Rep technique.

This would appear

to indicate that reciprocal implications on the Imp Grid, interpreted as
implying synonomous relationships between constructs, represent a lack of
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cognitive differentiation.

RepconNR scores, however, were found to have a

non-significant correlation with differentiation scores, a finding running
counter to prediction.

The lack of significant correlation may be accounted

for by the fact that differentiation analysis misrepresents superordinatesubordinate relationships, as signifying a lack of differentiation rather than
as representative of cognitive integration.
The findings regarding Hypothesis 3 demonstrated that none of the
four connectedness socres were effective discriminators of the thre lad
dering groups, thereby contradicting predictions for each of the four con
nectedness scores.

However, the result of these computations revealed that

there was a greater difference between the I? ratio for LadconWR scores and
laddering groups and the _F ratio for LadconNR scores and laddering groups
than would have been expected since one of the premises adopted at the
outset of this research was that there would be little variation between
connectedness scores with reciprocals and those without reciprocals for the
"laddered" constructs.

However, upon observing these F values it was

decided that a comparison of these two laddering connectedness scores should
be made.

A t_ test between LadconWR scores (M = 1.87) and LadconNR scores

(M = 0.29) yielded highly significant results (t_ (53) = 20.99, _£ < .001)
indicating the inaccuracy of the initial assumption and demonstrating that
constructs from different hierarchical levels may, indeed, be rated
reciprocally in terms of implication schores.

This finding clearly suggests

that reciprocal implications should not be discounted when computing
connectedness scores, and, as such, RepconWR scores and LadconWr scores emerge
as the two most important connectedness measures in the calculation of
cognitive integration.
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The fact that neither LadconWR scores nor RepconWR scores discriminated
among high, medium, and low laddering scores may be attributed to the fact
that neither of these two connectedness scores accounts for both the
differentiation and integration aspects of cognitive complexity, whereas
in theory, at least, the laddering technique would appear to incorporate
both of these components.

One possible error with regard to relying upon

RepconWR scores or LadconWR scores to represent cognitive complexity is
conceivable in the situation where a subject has for his/her superordinate
constructs the dimension "good-bad" or "pleasant-unpleasant," and tends to
easily make the jump from the majority of his/her subordinate constructs
to that superordinate dimension.

The ease in jumping from subordinate to

superordinate dimensions may well be due to a lack of intervening hierarchical
levels, but nevertheless such a seemingly simplistic mode of interpreting
situations could result in a relatively high connectedness score.

It may

be that the more hierarchical levels one has within his/her cognitive structure,
the more difficult it is to perceive direct implications between very
low-level constructs and superordinate constructs.

Although this represents

only one example of a situation wherein connectedness scores could misrepresent
cognitive complexity, it is the contention of this investigator that laddering
scores theoretically offer considerably more potential as accurate
indicators of cognitive complexity in terms of the model of cognitive
structure presented herein.
In introducing the triangular-shaped model of cognitive structure
it was mentioned that a three-dimensional model .could more accurately
represent the pyramidal structure conceived of as reflecting the relation
ships between construct dimensions.

Figure 2 represents a more complex
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two-dimensional model in three-dimensional form, and it is presented in
this manner so as to make clear the potential differences in substructure
(life areas) complexity.

The important addition presented herein, therefore,

Insert Figure 2 about here

is that of substructures for different life areas.

The need for such an

addition becomes clear when considering the individual who demonstrates
a great deal of cognitive complexity with regard to a particular field,
whereas outside of that particular speciality he/she m a y demonstrate very
poor capabilities in comprehending and coping with a vast array of other types
of life situations.

Perhaps this is best exemplified by the stereotyped

image of the "mad scientist" who, while having a great deal of narrowly
defined expertise, reveals himself as severely deficient in his capacity
for interpreting

(differentiating and integrating) other life areas (e.g.,

ethics, interpersonal relationships, government, etc.) with the same breadth
of understanding that he demonstrates within his narrowly defined scientific
interests.
Figure 2 presents various hierarchical substructures

(e.g., inter^

personal values, government, religion* ethics, the arts, science, vocation)
within the cognitive structure, and each of these substructures, repre
senting various possible life areas, has a separate potential for elaboration
(hierarchical and horizontal).

The "interpersonal values" substructure

depicts a five stage ladder of the type tapped by the experimental laddering
technique used in the present study.

In order to demonstrate possible

defining parameters of particular hierarchical levels, four descriptions
of levels are offered for the vocational life area herein represented as
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''mechanics.1' Thus, whereas interpersonal values are dealt with through
five hierarchical levels and mechanics by four, science for this
particular individual may have fifteen levels and religion perhaps three.
Although there may be a tendency for the various life areas to show
similarities with respect to their structural complexities

(Crockett, 1965),

it would appear probable that considerable differences in structural
complexity may exist across life areas for any particular individual.
Future research comparing within-subject complexity variance across life
areas with between-subject complexity (averaged across life areas) would
be of considerable benefit in clarifying the extent to, which an individual's
cognitive structural complexity can be viewed as a singular quantity.
The prediction of this investigator is that the c o m p l e x i t y % f cognitive
structure will be found to be "relatively" constant across life areas.
Such a study could also provide information regarding the degree of
convergence towards a central superordinate construct when laddering from
subordinate constructs associated with different life areas.
Regarding Hypothesis 4, the fact that neither the differentiation
scores, laddering scores, nor connectedness scores discriminated among
any of the four conceptual systems posited by Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder
(1961) contributes further evidence that cognitive complexity is not a
dimension contributing to such a classification system.

Rather, it would

appear that Conceptual Systems Theory draws primarily qualitative, rather
than quantitative, distinctions among the construct dimensions used by each
of the four system types.

As such, the present findings concur with

Harvey's more recent speculations

(Harvey, note 3) that these conceptual

systems are not sequentially invariant and probably do not discriminate between
persons on the basis of the number of dimensions which they use
their environments.

interpreting
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Finally, use of the laddering technique does appear to offer important
insights into that construct which Bieri identified as cognitive complexity.
An interesting and potentially significant aspect of this technique is that,
in almost all cases, subjects appeared to enjoy the task, and oftentimes
their intrigue was verbalized to the experimenter.

Such an attitude may

well lead to greater accuracy of results over tasks perceived as more tedious
(e.g., Rep technique and implication grid), however, future studies
m a y benefit by exploring the effects of the introversion-extraversion
dimension on subjects' laddering scores since introverted subjects m ay have
an advantage in this task.

In addition, there is certainly room for

further refinement of the laddering technique so as to make it more efficient
as an evaluative measure, and the need for some standardization of the
time factor across subjects in the generation of ladders is of fundamental
importance to future investigators relying on the laddering technique.
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Figure Captions
Figure 1.

Theoretical model of cognitive structure showing

constructs (circles), perceived relationships between constructs of
adjacent hierarchical levels (solid lines), and perceived relationships
between constructs of nonadjacent levels (dotted lines).

Included is

a hypothetical ladder of four constructs elicited by laddering technique
Figure 2*

Hypothesized three-dimensional model of cognitive struc

ture including six life areas, a sample ladder within*the Minterpersonal
values” life area, and general descriptions of the types of constructs
at each of four different hierarchical levels for a mechanic.
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